Lab Director and Primary Investigator: Dr. Daniel M. Bernstein

Dr. Bernstein’s work focuses on memory, perspective taking, and decision making, most notably false memory, fluency, the revelation effect, hindsight bias, Theory of Mind, and lifespan cognitive development. See below for a list of publications on which Dr. Bernstein has been a contributor.

Den mørke side af semantisk kontekst [The dark side of semantic context]: Semantic context boosts people’s confidence in their ability to comprehend Danish.

Semantic context helps people comprehend information, but it can also create illusions of truth and understanding. To what extent does increased semantic context boost people’s confidence in their ability to perform highly technical skills, such as understanding a foreign language? We addressed this question across five experiments by showing subjects a video clip of people speaking Danish. Some subjects saw the subtitled video while others saw the unsubtitled version. Then we asked subjects to rate how well they thought they would be able to understand Danish in new situations. We found that people who saw the subtitled videos thought they would understand more of that language in new situations compared to those who saw the unsubtitled videos, even though their actual understanding didn’t improve. These findings suggest that relative to situations of lesser semantic context, greater semantic context creates illusions not simply of understanding, but also of greater skill.

Hindsight Bias and COVID-19: Hindsight wasn’t 20/20 in 2020

Authors: Megan E. Giroux, Daniel G. Derksen, Patricia I. Coburn, & Daniel M. Bernstein

Journal: Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

Hindsight bias occurs when outcome information distorts people’s memories of past beliefs or exaggerates perceptions of outcomes’ foreseeability or inevitability. We investigated whether community and university participants in Canada and the U.S. exhibited hindsight bias for COVID-19. In Experiment 1 (N = 175), participants made original judgments about COVID-19 outcomes. Two months later, participants learned outcome information and recalled their original judgments (memory design). They also rated the foreseeability and inevitability of COVID-19. In Experiment 2 (N = 754), we used a hypothetical design. Participants learned outcome information before estimating how naïve peers would have responded two months earlier. Participants exhibited hindsight bias in memory and hypothetical estimations. However, they rated COVID-19 as unforeseeable and avoidable and generally did not exhibit differences in foreseeability and inevitability ratings across the two timepoints. Thus, hindsight bias for COVID-19 differs across memory distortions, foreseeability, and inevitability and extends to hypothetical judgments.

Stable Truthiness Effect Across the Lifespan

Authors: Daniel G. Derksen, Megan E. Giroux, Eryn J. Newman, & Daniel M. Bernstein

Journal: Developmental Psychology

When semantically related-photos appear with true-or-false trivia claims, people more often rate the claims as true compared to when photos are absent—truthiness. This occurs even when the photos lack information useful for assessing veracity. We tested whether truthiness changed in magnitude as a function of participants’ age in a diverse sample using materials appropriate for all ages. We tested participants (N = 414; Age range = 3 – 87 years) in two culturally-diverse environments: a community science center (First language: English (61.4%); Mandarin/Cantonese (11.6%); Spanish (6%), Other (21%); ethnicity: unreported) and a psychology lab (First language: English (64.4%); Punjabi (9.8%); Mandarin/Cantonese (7.4%); other (18.4%); ethnicity: Caucasian (38%); South Asian (30.7%); Asian (22.7%); other/unreported (8.6%). Participants rated trivia claims as true or false. Half the claims appeared with a semantically-related photo, and half appeared without a photo. Results showed that participants of all ages more often rated claims as true when claims appeared with a photo; however, this truthiness effect was stable across the lifespan. If truthiness age differences exist, they are likely negligible in the general population.

The Trajectory of Targets and Critical Lures in the Deese/Roediger–McDermott Paradigm: A Systematic Review

Authors: Patricia I. Coburn, Kirandeep K. Dogra, Iarenjit K. Rai, & Daniel M. Bernstein

Journal: Frontiers

The Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm has been used extensively to examine false memory. During the study session, participants learn lists of semantically related items (e.g., pillow, blanket, tired, bed), referred to as targets. Critical lures are items which are also associated with the lists but are intentionally omitted from study (e.g., sleep). At test, when asked to remember targets, participants often report false memories for critical lures. Findings from experiments using the DRM show the ease with which false memories develop in the absence of suggestion or misinformation. Given this, it is important to examine factors which influence the generalizability of the findings. One important factor is the persistence of false memory, or how long false memories last. Therefore, we conducted a systemic review to answer this research question: What is the persistence of false memory for specific items in the DRM paradigm? To help answer this question our review had two research objectives: (1) to examine the trajectory of target memory and false memory for critical lures and (2) to examine whether memory for targets exceeded false memory for critical lures. We included empirical articles which tested memory for the same DRM lists with at least two testing sessions. We discuss the results with respect to single-session delays, long-term memory recall and recognition, remember and know judgments for memory, and the effect of development, valence, warning, and connectivity on the trajectory of memory. Overall, the trajectory of targets showed a relatively consistent pattern of decrease across delay. The trajectory of critical lures was inconsistent. The proportion of targets versus critical lures across delay was also inconsistent. Despite the inconsistencies, we conclude that targets and critical lures have a dissimilar trajectory across delay and that critical lures are more persistent than targets. The findings with respect to long-term recall and recognition are consistent with both Fuzzy Trace Theory and Associative-Activation Theory of the DRM effect. The generation of false memory with brief delays (3–4 s) is better explained by Associative-Activation Theory. Examining the connectivity between target items, and critical lures, and the effect that has during study and retrieval, can provide insight into the persistence of false memory for critical lures.

Harm To Others Reduces The Sunk-Cost Effect

Authors: Zachariah I. Hamzagic, Daniel G. Derksen, M. Kyle Matsuba, André Aßfalg & Daniel M. Bernstein

Journal: Memory & Cognition

The sunk-cost effect (SCE) is the tendency to continue investing in something that is not working out because of previous investments that cannot be recovered. In three experiments, we examine the SCE when continued investment violates the ethic of care by harming others. In Experiment 1, the SCE was smaller if the sunk-cost decision resulted in harmful consequences towards others (an interaction between sunk cost and the ethic of care). In Experiment 2, participants considered vignettes from their own or another person's perspective. We observed an interpersonal SCE – people showed the SCE when taking the perspective of others. We did not replicate the interaction found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we used statistically more powerful analyses – Bayesian sequential hypothesis testing – to examine the interaction between sunk cost and the ethic of care. We found evidence in favor of the interaction; the SCE was smaller if the sunk-cost decision harmed others. We suggest that violating one’s ethic of care de-biases decision-making by overshadowing sunk costs. These findings may help explain decision-making in real-world situations involving large investments.

No Peak-End Rule for Simple Positive Experiences Observed in Children and Adults

Authors: Eric Y. Mah & Daniel M. Bernstein

Journal: Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

We investigated the tendency of children and adults to rely on the most intense and final moments when judging positive experiences, a heuristic known as the peak-end rule. This rule allows us to judge experiences quickly, but it can bias judgments. In three experiments involving various age groups (N = 988, ages 2–97), we attempted to replicate prior findings of a peak-end rule for small and simple positive experiences (e.g., receiving small gifts; Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008). Based on the original study and peak-end rule predictions, we hypothesized that individuals of all ages would be less satisfied with a highly desirable gift followed by a less desirable gift than with a highly desirable gift alone. We failed to observe the peak-end rule in preschoolers, school-aged children, younger adults, or older adults in any of the contexts we investigated. Our results show little support for positive peak-end rule effects and mark boundary conditions for the rule.

Fluency Misattribution and Auditory Hindsight Bias

Authors: Daniel M. Bernstein, Ragav Kumar, Michael E. J. Masson & Daniel J. Levitin

Journal: Memory & Cognition

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants’ estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg’s (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611–653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.

A Systematic Review of Theory of Mind’s Precursors and Functions

Authors: Daniel G. Derksen , Michelle C. Hunsche, Megan E. Giroux, Deborah A. Connolly, & Daniel M. Bernstein

Journal: Zeitschrift für Psychologie

We conducted a systematic review of longitudinal theory of mind (ToM) studies, focusing on the precursors to and functional outcomes of ToM in typically-developing samples. Our search yielded 87 longitudinal studies, all of which involved children and adolescents. Early attention skills, executive function development, and the use of language are precursors to ToM development. Additionally, quality interaction with parents and older siblings can foster early improvements in ToM. Healthy ToM development improves social relationships with peers and produces greater desire to engage in prosocial behaviors. However, victimized individuals with highly-developed ToM may engage in increased aggression. Future longitudinal research is needed to investigate the functional outcomes resulting from ToM changes in adulthood.

False-Belief Reasoning From 3 to 92 Years of Age

Authors: Daniel M. Bernstein, Alisha Coolin, Ashley L. Fischer, Wendy Loken Thornton, Jessica A. Sommerville

Journal: PLOS One

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.